Volume 9

Issue 1

4-1904

The Forum - Volume 9, Issue 7

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/forum

Recommended Citation
The Forum - Volume 9, Issue 7, 9 DICK. L. REV. 137 (2020).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/forum/vol9/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in The Forum by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more information, please
contact lja10@psu.edu.

THE FORUM.
BUSINESS MANAGERS

EDITORS
CLAUDK T. RENiO, Edior-in- Chief
GEORGE E.

No. 7

APRIL, 1905.

VOL. IX.

WOLFE

ADDISON M. BOWMAN, Business Aanager.
FOSTER HELLER
P,

PERCY LEE TYLER

ARTHUR L.

JOHN RAUFFENBART

VICTOR BRADDOCK

HARRY M.

FEED.

SHOWALTER

H. E. SORBER

REESER

A. JOHNSON
Roy S. HICKS

Subscription, $1.25 per annum, payable in advance.

MOOT COURT
THOS. FARRELL vs. PHILA. SHOE CO. AND JOHN ADAMS.
Injunction-Contractnot to 8ell within certainstates-Reasonablerestraintmay
be stipulatedfor-Constructionof agreement-Damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Adams had been conducting the business of making shoes of a certai n
repute. He sold out the business to Farrell for $400,000. That would have
been a fair price for the plant, material, machinery and good will, but Farrell
refused to buy unless as an additional considerati6n Adams covenanted not to
engage in the "making and sale" of shoes in Pennsylvania, Maryland, West
Virginia, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio, in all of which states
Farrell had been selling shoes in large quantities. Subsequently, the Phila.
Shoe Co. was incorporated and it employed Adams in the sale of shoes, and
he caused sale to be made in four of the said states, viz: Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Delaware and New Jersey. This is a bill to enjoin the defendant
company and Adams from continuing the former to employ Adams, the latter
to continue to be employed In his present capacity and for damages, SI0,000.
.,indly for the complainant.
Reasonable restraint here. Such restraint valid. Clark on Contracts, 455.
Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473. Court will not inquire into
adequacy of consideration. McClurg's Appeal, 58 Pa. 51. Damages should be
awarded proportionate to actual loss sustained by Farrell. Wilkinson v.
Colley, 164 Pa. 35; Moore v. Colt, 127 Pa. 289.
Stall for respondents.
Agreements in restraint of trade to be valid must be limited as to time and
partial In their locality. Cleaver v. Lenhart, 182 Pa. 285. Any restraint of
trade affecting the interstate trade and commerce of the United States is invalid. 166 U. S. 290.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

SHOWALTER, J. :-This action is brought to restrain John Adams, one of

the defendants, from selling or making shoes in Pennsylvania, Maryland,
West Virginia, Delaware, New Jersey, New York and Ohio in violation of a
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covenant in a bill of sale executed by Adams. The defendant sets up as a
defense that this is an agreement in restraint of trade.
While the law to a certain extent tolerates contracts in restraint of trade
or business, when made between vendor and purchaser, and will uphold them,
they are not to be treated with special indulgence if such restraint produces a
monopoly which is advantageous to the covenantee and at the same time
detrimental to the public interest. The law has always regarded monopolies
as hostile to the rights and interests of the public.
In determining contracts in restraint of trade, they must be judged according to the circumstances on which they arise and in subservience to the
general rule, that there must be no injury to the public by its being deprived
of the restricted party's industry and that the party himself must not. be
precluded from pursuing his occupation and thus prevented from supporting
himself and family. But contracts in partial restraint of trade, i. e., those
which restrain from pursuing a busines within a defined area less than the
whole country, will be enforced if the space of exclusion is no wider than is
reasonably required for the protection of the covenantee in the enjoyment of
the business to which the covenant relates and not so large as to interfere with
the interests of the public.
To apply the doctrine to the contract between Farrell and Adams, it will
be seen that the contract is only partial with respect to the locality in ;vhich
Adams may manufacture and sell shoes. It does not exclude him from more
territory than is absolutely necessary for Farrell to carry on a successful
business, for the shoe trade 6f this establishment extends over till the states
mentioned in the contract. When Farrell bought the inanufacturing plant
from Adams, he took it on the express condition that Adams should not have
anything to do with the shoe trade in these states. For this right and the
establishment, lie paid a good consideration, viz: $400,000, and now it would be
highly inequitable to allow Adams to flagrantly break his contract and probably ruin the plaintiff's business. The defendant was at liberty to sell the
property and good will of his trade in the most advantageous way in the
market and in order to enable him to do this, it was necessary that he should
be able to preclude himself from entering into competition with the purchaser.
Adams could not have obtained the consideration which was paid him if it had
been understood that this contract which he has violated had no validity. He
is appropriating to himself a part of that which he has sold to the plaintiff
and which is valuable to him. Itis unlike the caseswherethe prohibition extends beyond what the interests of the purchaser require or is in any way unreasonable.
Since we deem this a valid contract, and since $10,000 represents the loss
suffered by the plaintiff from the breach thereof, the court orders that the
defendant pay said sum to the plaintiff and that an Injunction issue restraining
defendant from further continuing in the shoe trade in the states mentioned
in the contract.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

That A, in selling out a certain manufacturing business, may, as further
inducement to the vendee to buy, agree not to become a competitor with the
latter is not to be questioned.
If A has been selling his goods all over the earth, it would seem reasonable
to tolerate his contract not to compete anywhere, for, so far as the public is
concerned, it cannot matter to it whether'its wafits are supplied by A or by
biq vendee, and there is no justification for supposing that both could supply
them, but for the stipulation. However, the American courts would probably
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not be tender concerning the restraint of trade so far as it affected the populations beyond the United States. Their charity would likely begin and remain
at home.
It appears that Adams had sold extensively in seven states, and that he
promised not to sell in those states. In this there was no intolerable restraint
of trade. It was legitimate for Farrell to desire to have no more competition
than Adams had had, and particularly not to have Adams' own competition,
and since the latter had been supplying the market in these states, it was not
unreasonable that he should stipulate to refrain thereafter from doing so.
Plttsburg Stone Co. v. Penna. Stone Co., 208 Pa. 37.
The Philadelphia Shoe Company was not a party to this contract, but was
employing Adams to do acts which he had agreed not to do. Although it
could do these acts by some other agent, it might be restrained from doing
them through him.
Adams had agreed not to engage in the "making and sale" of shoes in
Pennsylvania and six other states. Possibly, being agent to sell shoes, he
could not with any strictness, be said to be engaged in the making of them.
He was, however, selling them, and though he was selling not for himself,
but for another, was selling for compensation, and in so doing might be as
serious an injury to Farrell as were he selling for himself.
That damages for a past breach of his contract might be recovered from
Adams; is beyond question. The other defendant would, however, not necessarily be liable for the same damages. That damages can be recovered by a
bill, whose main object is an injunction, is incontestable, nor is it an obstacle
that the injunction may be levelled against all the defendants, while damages
can be decreed against only one of them.
Appeal dismissed.

L2 INGLE'S PETITION.
Liquor licenses-Act of May 18, 1887-Judicial notice-Duties and powers
of the court
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Lingle petitioned the Quarter Sessions for a license to sell liquors at a hotel.
The certificate accompanying his application was signed by 350 citizens.
There was no remonstrance.
The judge in consequence of knowledge previously possessed, by him, and
of knowledge gained from inquiries out of court, concluded that he was a
drunkard, and would probably not observe the law.
It was decided also that the place for which the license was sought was
not a fit place, since other places more eligible, for which licenses were sought,
existed in sufficient number to meet the needs of the community.
Appeal.
Clark for the appellant..
Where no objection appears that petitioner is disqualified in respect to
citizenship, habits or character, order of court refusinglicense will be reviewed.
Brewing Co's. License, 127 Pa. 535. Objections are to be brought to the attention oftheeourt. Reed'sAppeal,3 C. C.R. 301. Evidenceshould have been"
heard as to sobriety of the applicant.
Keenan, amicus curiae.
Judge Is not bound to grant a license to one whom he knows to be unfit.
It Is entirely discretionary with him. Raudenbach's Petition, 120 Pa. 328;
Steven's Application, 5 C. C. R. 627 - Reed's Appeal, 114 .V. 452.
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OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

J. :-The appellant was the petitioner in the court below for a
license to sell liquor in a hotel, in other words he wished a retailer's license.
His application was signed by 350 citizens and no remonstrances were presented against him. But the license wag refused by the court on thegrounds
that he was not a fit man to have the license owing to the fact that he was a
drunkard, and also for the reason that there were applications before the court
for retail license at other places, which in the opinion of the court were more
adapted, better suited, and more eligible for the purposes and existed in
sufficient number to satisfy the needs of the community. The court in refusing stated that his opinion was based on knowledge previously possessed
and on his personal inquiries out of court.
Two questions present themselves in this case, namely: Can a court form
his opinion on data gathered by him out of court or known by him independent of his judicial position, and secondly, can he of his own discretion in consequence of such knowledge, refuse a retail liquor license?
It has been'said that a court will take notice in ajudicial capacity, of any
and all things which are or occur within his jurisdiction which should be
generally known. This is too broad, but it is true that a court will -take
judicial notice of such things as are of general notoriety. Itwould be difficult
to state any chalk-line rule in this discussion, for in the absence of precedent
applicable to particular circumstances, courts may takejudicial notice of many
things, or may refuse to take notice, in a manner quite contrary to the conclusions of the ordinary mind. Nevertheless, if the court is so disposed, he may
take notice of certain facts, even though there be no rule or precedent in the
particular matter at hand.
IIThere are facts of which the trial tribunal takes notice without the production of proof by parties to the litigation. The tribunal may already know
them, or it may advise itself of their existence in any mode to which it may
choose to resort; consulting, if it will, any documents or writings, or any
person who may be able to impart the information." Trickett on Judicial
Notice, 9 FoRum 67, (Jan. 1905.)
It would be difficult to enumerate the various facts of which judicial notice
has been taken or which may be the subject of judicial notice. It is sufficient
to say that the source of that notice may be any document, person or thing
in which the judge may repose confidence, whether he is justified in that repose or not, or may be from any fact or knowledge of anything of which he is
possessed himself, the only pre-requisite being that there must be something
material on which he can base his opinion. Rogers, J., in Flanigen v. Wash.
Ins. Co., 7 Pa. 306. Understand, there are many things of which a judge may
not take judicial notice, but of those things of which he may take notice
judicially, the source may be any which meets with his approval.
The Actof General Assembly of May 13, 1887, P. L., in giving the authority
to the Court of Quarter Sessions to grant licenses says, "In the opinion of the
court . . . the applicants are not fit. " In the as at bar we have the
presentation of the application, and the opinion of the court that such applicant is not fit. He may therefore refuse. It is said that the character of the
applicant cannot be attacked, and that the testimony as to fitness can be
raised only on the filing of proper remonstrances. In this case there were no
remonstrances and no attempt has been or is made to introduce evidence of the
unfitness of the applicant. But the court in forming his opinion, has taken
judicial notice of the fact that he is unfit, and has formed an opinion unfavorable to the applicant. The fact that the court has found that the applicant
is a man of intemperate habits is sufficient to justify him in forming this
BARNEI,
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opinion adverse to the applicant, and the source of the court's information.
cannot be questioned.
In view of these facts we are of the opinion that a court may from his
opinion from facts gained outside of the court in matters exercising his discretion, and that he has the power to refuse to grant a retail license on such
ground.
The fact that other places of fit character have filed application, but do
not as yet hold a license, does not appeal to us as a ground for refusal.
Therefore, It is the opinion of the court that the decree of the court below
should not be disturbed.
The within license is refused, and the courtbelow sustained.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
That the court in granting licenses to sell liquor, is performing an administrative rather than judicial work, is too easily perceived to justify much
discussion. Cf. Raudenbusch's Petition, 120 Pa. 328; Wheelin's Petition, 134
Pa. 554. Under some laws, quite other officers do this work. Thejudges are
required to do it in Pennsylvania not because It belongs to the office, but because no other custodian of this power so worthy of the confidence that he
would exercise it aright, can be found. The results of conferring it on the
ordinary person who might be expected to receive it, were it withdrawn
from the judges, are positively appalling. The judges are frail enough but their
age, experience, position, and the duration of their terms of office are a better guaranty of tolerably faithful performance of their duties, than could
be looked for in this era of corruption, under the baleful reign of the politician
class, from any other.
From the non-judicial nature of their work, we might expect to find judges
like other administrative officers, using the knowledge they acquire otherwise
than by the aid of witnesses and documents produced under the rules which
regulate so-called trials.
The first question presented is, can the court decide on the fitness of the
applicant for a license, by means of knowledge not gained as in ordinary litigation ?
The judge may insist on the appearance of the applicant before him, and
may guess his inside from his outside, may satisfy himself from the applicant's
looks, that he is not a fit person. Raudenbusch's Petition, 120 Pa. 328. He
may know, it matters not how, that the applicant is a drunkard or a thief, and
for that reason refuse the license. Id Meade's License, 161 Pa. 375 ; Knarr's
Petition, 127 Pa. 555. Probably the applicant can be interrogated as to self incriminatory matters, on pain of failure, if he does not answer. At all events,
the judge may refuse to give the license unless he submits himself to inspection. Wheelin's Petition, 134 Pa. 5.54. In American Brewing Company's License, 161 Pa. 378, many applications were refused although there were no remonstrances, because the court had "personal knowledge of the facts pertinent
to the cases and made careful inquiry from reliable [i. e. in its opinion]
sources as to the necessity of these licenses for the accommodation of the public and thefitness of th applicants." "The court may," says McCollum, J.,
"and sometimes very properly does, act of its own knowledge obtained from
observation of the applicant, and acquaintance with the district. If the court
from such observation and acquaintance, knowsthat the applicant is not a fit
person, or that his house is not necessary for the accommodation of the public,
the license may be refused on such knowledge," etc. Kelminski's License,
164 Pa. 231.
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Judges should not be more stupid than other people, and they should know,
as they do, with what facility petitions for privileges, appointments, etc., may
be secured for anybody, and how absolutely iiresponsible the ordinary man
feels when he puts his name to a representation in favor of some determinate
person, however deleterious to the public as a whole, the success of the person whom he favors would be. Men will sign petitions for the pardon of a
murderer, if they think he will only murder some one else than themselves,
should be enlarged. The consciencelessness with which men who wear fine
clothes, and look very good, will ask for thelicensiug of a man and a place to dispense liquors in a community, when the palpable effect of such dispensation is
ruinous, morally and economically, would startle, had we not grown used
to it. A judge would then be a credulous ass, that would, when he could resort to other means of enlightenment, accept as veridical, the statements of
certifiers and petitioners. If he does not intend to be imposed on, to the hurt
of the community, he must exercise a little wholesome incredulity, and keep
his own eyes, ears and wits open.
If the fitness of the person may be ascertained by the judge by his own
methods, afortiori,may the fitness of the place and the necessity of licensing
it, be. In Thomas' Appeal, 169 Pa. 111, Savidge, P. J., refused licenses because
"from acquaintance with the district, I have made up my mind the house is
not necessary." He did the same in Gross' Appeal, 1 Superior, 640. Cf. Kelminski's License, 164 Pa. 231; Raudenbach's Petition, 120 Pa. 328; Gross'
License, 161 Pa. 344. The court understands or may make himself understand
the communities which comprise his district. He may know- how many
licensed places for the sale of liquor are necessary for them. If there is an excessive number of applicants, he must refuse some, and he should select for the
license, those which are the more eligible. It will become his duty to deny
the license to wholly fit applicants, whose places are intrinsically unexceptionable, if there is too large a number of such applicants and places.
Appeal dismissed.
COMMONWEALTH vs. BERNEY.
Indictment for receiving stolen goods-No direct evidence offered by Commonwealth- Witnesses attempted to identify the tin as being that of Penna.1B. B.
Co.-Becord offered and received in evidence that seal unbroken when car
arrivedin Altoona.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Superior court.
Menges for appellant.
It is indispensable for the use of these statements that the entrante be unavailable as a witness. Greenleaf, vol. 1, p. 204. Person who made original
memoranda should have been called and his suppletory oath given. Curren
v. Crawford, 4 S. & R. 4. Analogous facts in Ramsey v. New York & New
Jersey .TelephoneCo., 49 N. J. Law 322.
Long for appellee.
To exclude books kept under such circumstances would be to exclude all
books kept by clerks or any person 'who has no knowledge of the matters
which lie puts down. Alter v. Beigham, 8 Watts 77. Not necessary that slips
be produced. Stokes v. Fenner, 10 Phila. 14.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COUR.T.

J. :-The facts of the case as they come to this court are long and
rather confusing. We will condense the material facts so as to make them
more comprehensive.
SETZER,
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The defendants, Berney and Black, were charged with having received
stolen goods.
The Commonwealth showed that a certain amount of pig tin was loaded
on a car at Jersey City and the car was sealed and manifested to Altoona.
The Commonwealth claims that this car arrived in theEastAltoona yards
with the seal unbroken ; that when the car was examined some time afterwards in the west end of the yard the seal was broken and the pig tin was
missing.
To prove that the seal was unbroken the Commonwealth offered in evidence a record kept in. one of the railroad offices in Altoona of cars whose
seals were broken when the same arrived in the city of A ltoona.
A witness testified that it was a rule of the company to have their inspectors examine every car when it arrived in the yards and when a seal was
broken the inspector sent in a written slip giving report of the same to the
person who kept the record. There was no record of the breach of the seal in
question.
There was circumstantial evidence proved implicating the defendants in
the crime, but these are the only material circumstances necessary to dispose
of the present question.
The admission of this record was objected to for several reasonsFirst-Because the person who made the entries in the"record was not the
person who made the inspection.
Second-That aq the report of the inspectors was written on slips, these
slips should be produced.
Third-That the inspector who inspected the car should have been called,
or at least that there should be some evidence offered to show that the Commonwealth could not produce the inspector who inspected the car.
Fourth-That the record was merely hearsay and admissible.
We must of course presume that the requirements in the admission of
these records were complied with, that is, that they were presented with a
suppletory oath of the clerk, and that the entries were made within a short
time after the inspection of the cars.
Entries made of records of goods that have been shipped or received are
admissible as books of original entry. 5 W. & S. 377:
Tile first objection cannot be sustained because it is not requisite that the
entry should be made fron personal knowledge. If this were not so it would
abridge this sort of evidence, since it seldom happens that the party is an eye
witness to all the details that go to make up the quantum of charge in the
books.
If entries made by information of a clerk were to be excluded it would
exclude all books kept by clerks or any person who has no knowledge of the
matters which he puts down. If a servant makes memoranda and on the
same or the next day entries from them are made by the master into his
books, these are books of original entry. Hoover v. Gehr, 62 Pa. 136.
The second objection must be refused because where the entries are first
made upon a slate or paper and afterwards transcribed into the regular account book such book may be admitted in evidence if the entries are transcribed within a reasonable time. It was deemed that the first records were
merely instruments or helps from which the knowledge is derived. Inghram
v. Borkman, 9 S. & R. 285.
We must agree with the lower court in that since the inspectors reported all
cars whose seals were broken and that if no report of the car in question was
entered it follows that the car had been inspected and was found intact, without the seal broken. But it wps not necessary to procluce the slips because
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these slips correspond to a day book and the record in the office to a ledger,
and it has been held that a ledger is a book of original entry. Hoover v. Gehr,
62 Pa. 136.
We must deny the third objection. In Coren v. Crawford, 4 S. & R. 3, it
was held that a book of original entries, verified by oath of the party, is good
evidence to prove a sale and delivery of goods, and it is nbt necessary to fortify
the book by oath of the clerk who made the delivery. Even when it does
not clearly appear to be a book of original entries it must be submitted to the
jury to decide upon. This is no reason for its exclusion altogether, although it
is a very good reason for subjecting it to the rigid scrutiny in the examination before the jury. Still the fact remains that under these circumstances it
would have been almost impossible to determine which inspector Inspected the
car in question, since there was no record sent in of cars received whose seals
were unbroken ; therefore we think that the evidence offered by the Commonwealth was the best which the nature of the case was susceptible.
The last objection is not well founded since such entries are In the
nature of exceptions to the hearsay rule.
A book of original entry is not a book of past transactions, but a memorandum of transactions as they occhr. It must bean account of daily transactions
of the party and not a receipt book. But it has been held that the entry need"
not be made exactly at the time of the occurrence. It suffices if it be within
a reasonable time so that it may appear to have taken place while the memory
of the fact was recent or the source from which the knowledge of it was derived, unimpaired. The law fixes no precise moment when the entry should
be made. Ifdoneataboutthe time ofthetransaction it issufficient. Evidence
of a sale and delivery of goods or work done founded on a book of original
entries with a suppletory oath, though not admissible by the common law of
England, originated here from the peculiar situation of an infant colony, and
has continued to the present time with less inconvenience and fewer attempts
at fraud than would at first have been supposed by those accustomed to the
strictness of the common law rules of evidence.
The questions that have arisen as to the nature of proof required and the
extent to which it may be received, have been decided on theprinciple of giving to the evidence all fair and reasonable latitude. The judgment of the
lower court is therefore affirmed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The question before the jury was, had the seal upon the car been broken
before its arrival in the East Altoona yards?
It was proven that the railroad company employed inspectors whose duty
it was to inspect every car on its arrival, and to make a written report of the
breach of the seal of any car, to an employee who kept a record. This record,
proven by the person who kept it, was produced at the trial, and it contained
no report concerning the car in question. From this, the Commonwealth intended to argue that no report was made to the record-keeper, and that the
seal of the car in question was not broken. The inspectors made their reports
upon written slips, none of which were produced.
Why should slips have been produced? On the hypothesis supported by
the Commonwealth, the seal of the car had not been broken. Then, no slip
concerning this car was ever in existence. It does not appear that any other
cars of the same train had been broken. Then there would be no slips concerning these cars. It does not appear that any ears of any train, during a
month preceding or following the arrival in Altoona of this car, had been
broken. Then there would be no slips for these months. The non-production
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of slips was therefore no obstacle to the reception of the evidence, because the
evidence was tendered for the very purpose of proving that no slips had been
in existence.
But should the inspector not have been called? We are not to presume
that this company employs many inspectors and that it had no means of
knowing who was the inspector at the time under consideration. Nor are we
to take for granted that this inspector could not have been produced and
sworn, He might, so far as appears, have had recollectiun of the arrival of
this particular train, and of the condition of its cars. Had he not, he might
have testified as to his duty and habit and expressed his conviction whether,
In view of this duty and habit, he would have returned the car as broken, had
it in fact been broken. We see no sufficient reason for dispensing the Commonwealth from extracting from this inspector this statement, before attempting to induce the jury to infer, from the state of the record, that he had found
the car unbroken. Had the inspector been dead, or undiscoverable, possibly
the presumption that he had done his duty would suffice. In the absence of
explanation of his non-production, we do not think that presumption should
obtain., That it was his duty to make careful inspection and truthful reports
of the facts discovered, we know. We do not know whether he was in the
habit of doing his duty, nor whether he himself was, at the time of the trial,
persuaded that on this occasion he did his duty. The defendant, we think,
was entitled to object to any inferences from his not having reported the car
in question, until this evidence that his omission to report was the result of
his having found the car unbroken had been given.
That the inspector did not report this car, may, we think, be safely inferred from the record-book. The keeper of that book was sworn, testifying
to the mode of keeping the book, and that had the car been reported.
the report would be found in it. It was not necessary that he should have
recalled the particular transaction, and remembered that no report was
made. A witness may declare his habit, and his conviction, in viewof it,
that he acted in conformity with it. A subscribing witness, e. g. who has no
recollection of the occurrence, may say that he would not have subscribed,
had he not seen the execution of the paper. Cf. Wigmore, Evid. 166, 839.
There are cases in which a record kept by B on the report of A, of a fact
is held to be evidence not simply of the report of A, but of the fact. Entries
of sales made by B, on report of them by A, a servau t of the common employer,
have been received as proof of the sales. Hoover v. Gehr, 62 Pa. 136; Jones
v. Long, 3 W. 325; Ingraham v. Bockins, 9 S. & R. 285, and, probably, the
absence of acharge in the book kept by B would be receivable to disprove a sale
alleged to have been made by A, when it is shown to have been A's duty and
habit to report all sales to B. If such is the rule in regard to books of original
entries, we are unwilling to extend it to a case of the class before us, until
the non-production of B is accounted for, or it is shown that he was in the
habit of reporting all facts of the given class, and that he probably acted on this
occasion, in conformity with this habit.
The inspector, without explanation not being produced, and there being
no evidence of his scrupulousness in the discharge of his duties, it is asking too
much of the jury to infer from his duty, that he made the proper inspection
of this car, and from the fact that he did not report a breach of the seal of the
car, that he discovered that its seal was unbroken.
Since the integrity of the seal on, the arrival of the car in Altoona was an
important circumstance, serious error was conntmitted.
Judgment reversed and v.f. d. n. awarded.
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NEWCOMB vs. BARNES ET AL.
Judgment by confession-Purchase of realty with partnershipfunds-Bxecu.
tion in judgment and realty sold-Partnershipcreditors obtainzngjudgment against the firm subsequent to plaintirs individual lien claim a
priorityin the distribution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Barnes and Bedford were engaged in mercantile partnership, during.
which Barnes took moneys of the partnership amounting to about $5,000 and
invested the same in certain lands, taking the title papers in his own name,
which were recorded. Subsequently, Barnes went to the plaintiff and borrowed $1,000, confessing judgment for that amount, which was entered of
record.
A year later Barnes and the firm became insolvent, execution was issued
on the above judgment and the above laud was levied upon and in due course
sold. The fund is in the hands of an auditor for distribution among their
creditors. Partnership creditors who obtained judgment against the firm subsequent to plaintiff's individual lien claim a priority in the distribution.
Fox for judgment creditors.
Resulting trust created by the purchase of land with partnership funds.
Erwin's Appeal, 39 Pa., 535. Act of Assembly 1901, P. L. 425, applicable here
If it does not appear on the face of the deed or by some recorded agreement in
writing that the laud was held as partnership property, it does not have that
quality. Kepler v. Dime Savings Bank & Loan Co., 101 Pa. 602. When
property not necessary for partnership business they hold as tenants in common. Coeder v. Heiling, 27 Pa. 84. Barnes therefore owned an undivided
moiety of the whole.
Hassertfor defendants.
Property purchased by Barnes was partnership property. George on
Partnership, p. 124. Resulting trust created in favor of the firm. Fairchild v.
Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 421. Partnership creditors are entitled to priority in the
distribution of funds in the hands of the auditor. Wartmau's Appeal, 107 Pa.
327.
REPORT OF THE AUDITOR

LONG, Auditor :-The question now before the auditor is, whether partnershipcreditors of an insolventfirm, can claim priority over the individual creditors of one of the firm, a portion of the firm's assets having been appropriated
by one member of the firm and invested in real estate, the title being taken in
his individual name and the same being subsequently recorded; the same
partner subsequently confessing judgment in favor of the plaintiff, on the
property which he had purchased with the partnership moneys, in the sum of
$1,000.
Your auditor believes that in the distribution of the property two questions should be considered, 1st: What would be the 'esult if the moneys of the
firm were taken by one 'of the partners with consent and knowledge of his copartner and invested in real estate, the title being taken in his individual
name or in their names as tenants in common-? 2nd: What would be the
result if the moneys were taken without consent or knowledge of his co-partner
and invested in real estate, the title being taken in his individual name ?
Ordinarily as between partners-themselves, "realestate may be shown to be
firm property, notwithstanding it be purchased with firm assets and the title
be taken in the name of one of them only or in them as tenants in common;
but, as again-t innocent purchasers for value and lien creditors dealing with
the owner of land on the faith of a recorded title and without notice that it is
held in a different way from what it appears on record, parol evidence is in-
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admissible to show that although the land was conveyed to the grantee as an
individual, yet held by him as partnership property, because the settled rule
of the courts is, that as to purchasers and creditors the deed will control and
those who deal with him have a right to act upon this presumption.
Where partnership assets have been taken by one member of a firm with
consent of his co-partner and invested in real estate, the title being taken
either in his name as an individual, or in their names as tenants in common,
the firm will not be permitted to show that the same is firm property as
against persons purchasing or giving credit to the holder of the legal title, because to do so would be to permit a person apparently owning property as an
individual to aver a different right in himself as a partner by which his relations to creditors and others are to be affected, would defeat the statute of
frauds and, in the opinion of the auditor, would be much worse than purchasing real estate without writing, because purchasers and creditors would have
no records to look to in order to be deceived and defrauded.
The Pennsylvania courts from the time of Hale v. Henrie, 2 Watts 143,
have held that when parties intend to bring real estate into partnership stock,
that intention must be manifested by deed or writing, placed on record, and
in McDermott v. Lawrence, 7 S. & R. 438, and Lancaster Bank v. Myley, 15,
Pa. 544, the court was of the opinion that if partners took property as tenants
in common then they held as tenants in common, and if it was taken in the individual name of one of the firm, then as to purchasers and creditors the
property should be considered as individual property of the holder of the legal
title, and that individual creditors would have priority over partnership creditors. In other words, "as partners take so they hold." Ridgway Budd Co.
Appeal, 15 Pa. 177; McComick's Appeal, 57 Pa. 54; Lefevre's Appeal, 69 Pa.
122; Titusville National Bank's Appeal, 83 Pa. 203; Stall's Appeal, 98 Pa. 257;
Shafer's Appeal, 106 Pa. 54; Warren v. Mitchell, 128 Pa. 153 ; Gunson's Appeal,
157 Pa. 303 ; Stover v. Stover, 180 Pa. 425; Curdy v. Hall, 208 Pa. 335.
Your auditor is, therefore, of the opinion that where the partnership moneys
are taken with consent of the co-partner then the deed will control, and individual creditors will have priority over partnership creditors in the distributibn of the partner's property, but where one partner fraudulently takes
moneys of the firm and invests them in real estate and takes a title in his
individual name, then there is sufficient dictum in some of the cases to warrant in fiolding that a resulting trust arises in favor of the firm on account of
the non-assenting partner being deprived of his property and the partnership
creditors being deprived of a part of the property upon which they rely for
payment of delfts, and in Lefevre's Appeal, 69 Pa. 122, Sharswood J., said, "for
one partner to purchase property with firm funds in his individual name,
without consent of his associates, was in fact a fraud and that a resulting trust
would arise in favor of the firm. " From Sharswood's, J., opinion one might
infer that in cases of fraud, then partnership creditors would take priority in
the distribution of partnership property, and in Baugh v. Daugherty, 32 Pa.
271, and Coder v. Huling, 28 Pa. 374, the court held that if a partner buy land
with partnership funds and take the deed in his own name a resulting trust
will accrue to the other partner. Your auditor then is of the opinion that if
the moneys of the firm wdre taken by Barnes with consent of his co-partner
und invested in real.property; that then the plaintiff as the individual bona fide
creditor of Barnes, will*take priority in the distribution of the fund, but that
if the moneys were taken by Barnes without consent of his co-partner and in
defraud of the firm, then a resulting trust arises in favor of Bedford, the nonassenting partner, and the partnership ereditoM will tpke priority over the
individual creditors of Barnes.
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Tie (omi,-el for the plaintiff contends that no resulting trust can arise in
favor of theimprtnership because the provisions of the Act of 1901, P. L. 425,
have not been complied with. The provisions of that act being that a resulting trust shall be void to bona fide judgment or other creditors or mortgagees
of the holder of the legal title or purchaser from such holder without notice,
unless: (1) a declaration of trust in writing has been executed and acknowledged by the holder of the legal title and recorded in the recorder's office, or
(2) unless an action of ejeetment has been begun by the person advancing the
money against the holder of the legal title. In the case at bar, Barnes, the
holder of the legal title, has not made a declaration of trust in writing, neither
has an action of ejectment been brought against him, yet your auditor believes
that a resulting trust can still arise even though the provisions of.. this act
have not been complied with, provided the moneys were taken and the property bought without consent or knowledge of the co-partner. Whilerecordn g of a deed is constructive notice, yet it would be no notice to Bedford if the
moneys were taken without his knowledge or consent, because a partner very
frequently buys property with his own money and takes the deed in his own
name, and I am of opinion that Bedford had no reasonable cause to believe
anything other than that state of affairs in this case.
If the jury finds tnat the moneys were taken without the consent and
knowledgeof Bedford, then the fund is tobedistributed by giving tihe partnership creditors priority; but if the jury finds that Bedford consented or had
knowledge that the land was purchased with firm moneys, then your auditor
is of the opinion that Newcomb, the individual creditor of Barnes, shall take
priority in the estate to the amount of his judgment for $1,000.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

When Barnes with the partnership money, obtained a cqnveyance to himself of the land, he took it subject to a trust in favor of the partnership. We
do not assume the consent of the other partner in the absence of evidence.
This trust could at common law not be asserted however, against a bonafide
purchaser for value from him.
The position of a mere lien creditor was not so favorable as that of a
grantee. A resulting trust that would be unenforceable against the latter, was
valid against the former.
The Act of June 4th, 1901, P. L. 425, declares thatsuch trusts shall be void
as to judgment and other creditors, or mortgagees of or purchasers from the
"holder of the legal title, " unless the latter has executed and recorded a
declaration of trust, or an ejeetment has been begun. Executed and recorded
a declaration when? Begun an ejectment when? As the law previously
stood, as against purchasers, the declaration had to be made and recorded or
other notice given before the purehase. It was not the intention of the legislature to change the law in this respect. But if the date of the purohaseis the
time when the declaration must have been made as respects a purchaser, the
date of the acquisition of the judgment or of the creation of the debt must be
the time when, as against the creditor, the declaration must have been made.
If the declaration can be effectively, made later than the purchase, or than
the acquisition of the lien, how long later? A year, five years, ten years?
And of what use is it to give the notice of the trust, after the purchase has been
made, or the lien obtained?
We think it clear that the intention of the legislature was that a resulting
trust should not be enforceable against anyliody, whether a creditor or
purchaser, unless he had constructive notice of it when he became such, and
that the constructive notice should lie either a. record or a declaration of
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trust or the pendency of an ejectment by the cestui que trust against the
trustee.
It is not necessary now to consider whether actual notice would not serve
the same purpose as this constructive notice.
Now, the protection to a bonafide purchaser for value against k resulting
trust did not depend on the knowledge on the part of the cestui que trust of
the facts which made him such. If A used B's money in buyinga farm, the
deed for which named A as grantee, and if A sold the farm to C, who had no
notice of the facts that gave rise to the trust, C acquired a right to the land
against B as well as A, although B had had no knowledge of the use by A of
his money in making the purchase.
Since it is the evident intention of the Act of 1901 to assimilate the immunity with respect to the trust, of a lien creditor and of a purchaser, it is
impossible to conclude, as does the learned court below, that the trust can be
asserted despite the want of actual or constructive notice of it, if the facts
show that the cestui que trust has not been guilty of laches in failing to procure and to record a declaration of trust, or to bring ejectment against the
legal tenant. Freedom from laches did not before the statute, preserve to the
cestui que trust his rights as against a purchaser. Nor does it now. Nor does
it preserve these rights as against a lien creditor.
The purchaser of the land under Newcomb's judgment has acquired it
free from the trust. Newcomb has acquired his lien free from the trust. He
is as much entitled to the money, despite the trust, as the sheriff's vendee is.
As the purchaser has got the indefeasible fee, the price he paid, is the
price of that fee. From it must be paid to Newcomb $1,000 with interest.
The balance must be paid either to Barnes, the defendant in the. execution, or
to the partnership, or its creditors. It must not be paid to Barnes, for the
object of the Act of 1901 cannot have been to make the trust invalid as against
the trustee, unless it shotild be declared, or unless the cestui que trust should
bring an ejectment. The judgment creditors of the partnership are therefore
entitled to it.
Exceptions to report sustained.
JARVIS vs. SABIN.
Contracts-Damages-Rule where vendor retains and uses goods contracted
for after breach by vendee.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Jarvis agreed to deliver 500 bushels of wheat of first-class quality, the agreed
price to be paid on delivery.
At the time stipulated Jarvis tendered the wheat, but Sabin refused to accept it, and gave no explanation for. his refusal.
Jarvis has since had the wheat ground into flour for his own use.
This is an action for damages for non-acceptance. Defendant contends
that Jarvis was bound to resell the wheat, or, at least, to hold it for defendant's benefit if he wished to hold him for damages.
Court charged that Jarvis could use the wheat and still recover damages.
Krebs for the plaintiff.
The vendor need not attempt a resale in order to fix the value of the goods.
Proof of it by any other satisfactory means is permissible. Andrews v. Hoover,
8 W. 239; 1 Vale 331, 333, in re. "Damages."
Robertson for the defendant.
The plaintiff, who claims damages for breach of contract, is as much bound
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to prove that he has sustained damages as he is to prove the contract itself.
Lentz v. Chohau, 42 Pa. 435; Burr v. Todd, 41 Pa. 206.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

J.:-In the case before us the plaintiff agreed with defendant to deliver wheat, to be paid for on delivery. Plaintiff delivered, but defendant refused to accept. Plaintiff then had the wheat ground into flour, and brings
this action to recover damages for breach of contract.
Did the plaintiff stiffer such damages that he should recover?
The general run of cases in Pennsylvaiiia seem to hold that if plaintiff
wishes to recover damages he should either sell, or hold the subject of the contract for defendant's benefit. Andrews v. Hoover, 8 W. 239.
Plaintiff was willing, and offered to perform his part of.the contract, but
the wheat was not accepted by defendant. This, certainly, was a breach of
contract on the part of defendant; but what are the damages ? What did the
flour bring, if sold ? and what was the cost of grinding? If plaintiff had sold
the wheat at the market price, then the measure of damages would be the
difference between the contract price and the market price, but when plaintiff
ground the wheatwe are at a loss to determine what damages he actually should
receive.
In Lentz v. Cholean, 42 Pa. 435, the court said in regard to damages for
breach of contract: -I The plaintiff who claims damages for breach of contract
is as much bound to prove that he has sustained damages as he is to prove the
contract itself." We fail to see how plaintiff can recover damages which he
has not shown ; therefore, the charge of the court below cannot be upheld.
PARK,

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Jarvis was to deliver 500 bushels of wheat. The title did not pass until the
selection of the 500 bushels, its tender to and acceptance by Sabin. It was tendered, but not accepted. Jarvis could not then treat the wheat as Sabin's, and
sue for the price. Unexcelled Fire Works v. Polites, 130 Pa. 536; Jones v.
Jennings Bros. & Co., 168 Pa. 493.
Indeed, he did not attempt to treat the wheat as Sabin's. On the contrary, he ground it into flour for his own use. Nor is his action for the price.
It is for damages. That he had a right to damages is not disputed. It is contended, however, by the defendant, that the only damages recoverable are the
difference between the price that Sabin had bound himself to pay and the price
obtained by a resale, and therefore, that Jarvis having made no resale, and,
indeed, rendered a resale impossible, he can recover at" most only nominal
damages.
That Jarvis could have resold, and, this sale being fairly conducted shortly
after Sabin's breach of contract, could have treated the price obtained thereat
as the actual value of the wheat, cannot be disputed. McHenry v. Bulifawr,
207 Pa. 15 ; Guillon v. Earnshaw, 169 Pa. 463 ; McCombs v. McKennan, 2 W.
& S., 216; Tompkins v. Haas, 2 Pa. 74; Kerr v. Shrader, 1 W. N. C. 33; Baltimore Smelting Co. v. Ammonia Co., 2 Super. 555. But facts might exist
which would make the price obtained at the second sale no fair test of the value.
Guillon v. Earushaw, 169 Pa. 463 ; Hooper v. Carpet Co., 11 Super. 634. When
that is the case, the actual market value of the goods must be otherwise ascertained, and the difference between it and the contract price will measure the
damages. It would follow that no resale is absolutely necessary. When one
is made, there may always be a dispute whether it was made at the right time
and place, whether a proper effort was made to secure the best price. No case
holds that, if the price at a resale is for any reason unreliable as a test of value,
the vendor can obtain only nominal damages. The resale must alwayp take
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place at a time later than that at which the vendee broke the contract. Yet
it is the value of the goods at this earlier time, i. e., the time when the vendee
should have accepted the goods, that the later sale is to ascertain. There may
always be a decline of value between these times.
It ought logically to follow that the vendor need not attempt a resale In
order to fix the value of the goods, and that proof of it by any other satisfactory means is permissible. Hooper v. Carpet Co, 11 Super. 634 ; Andrews v.
Hoover, 8 W. 239; McCombs v. McKennan, 2 W. & S. 216; Guillon v. Earnshaw, 169 Pa. 463 ; Girard v. Taggart, 5 S. & R. 19 ; Mobley v. Morgan, 8 Sadler 105. The burden is on the plaintiff to furnish satisfactory evidence, and the
court could not say that there could be none such unless there was a resale.
In an action for damages there can be a recovery of none but nominal damages, unless there is evidence of the amount of them-Jones v. Jennings Bros.
& Co., 168 Pa. 493; but in the case before us there was evidence of the damages, and the trial court informed the jury that these damages could be recovered, notwithstanding that.Jarvis did not make a resale of the wheat. The
verdict for the plaintiff was subsequently set aside on the ground that, in the
absence of a resale, there could be no satisfactory proof of the damages, and on
the second trial the verdict, under the instruction of the court, was for the defendant. In this there was error.
Judgment reversed, with v. f. d n.
JOHNSON vs. EARL.
Contract-Breach-Profitsas measure of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Earl employed Johnson to build a steam engine for him at a cost of $800;
but before Earl procured any material for this purpose or caused any work to
be done, he countermanded the order. The cost of the material and labor, had
the engine been made, would, at the rates prevailing when the contract was
made, have been $400, so that the profit would have been $400. Before the
engine could have been completed, the price of both material and labor, would
have risen to $500. This is an action for damages for Earl's withdrawal from
the contract.
Arnold for the plaintiff.
Measure of damages is difference between contract price and actual cost
of material and labor had the engine been completed. Electric Co. Appeal,
9 Sad. 37; Tugel v. Latour, 1 Wa N. C. 335; Sterfer v. Williams, 48 Pa. 450;
Wilson v. Hootsman, 2 Phila.. 296; Clark on Contract 696.
Clark for the defendant.
Measure of damages is the profits which would have accured, viz : $300.
Garsed v. Turner, 71 Pa. 56; Hdys v. Gronable, 34 Pa. 9; Coal Co. v. Royal
Co. 138 Pa. 46.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

JOHNSON, J. :-This is an action for damages for the breach of a contract
entered into by William Johnson with Edward Earl, whereby Johnson was to
build a steam engine for Earl at a cost of $800. Before Johnson had procured
any material or labor in contemplation of the contract, Earl countermands the
order. The cost of building the engine at the time of the contract is $400; the
cost at the time of the suit is $500.
Now, a notice or other overt act by a party to a contract expresing his
intention not to perform, is a renunciation, which gives the other party the
right to treat the contract as broken, and sue for damages, without tendering
performance on his part or waiting until the time allowed by the contract for
performance has elapsed., P. & L. Digest of Decisions, col. 4477.
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From almost the beginning Earl knew that Johnson would not build the
engine. He therefore had ample opportunity to get someone else to build it.
There is nothing in the statement of facts that would preclude this course. It
appears to us that if damage, beyond that suffered by the loss of his bargain,
with its attendant results and benefits, has been sustained by plaintiff it has
not been the fault of the defendant, but rather because of the plaintiff's inaction. Therefore, we cannot see that the damage claimed by the plaintiff
can be said to embrace any probable profits or great inconvenience, etc.,
suffered by the plaintiffs. We believe, however, that the bargain with its accompanying benefits was of considerable value to plaintiff, as suggested in
Bitner v. Brough, 1 Jones, 127; and that damages occasioned by the breach,
touch not only the immediate bargain but follow the benefit of this bargain
which is anticipated by the parties at the time. of execution, and must be
computed in the apportionment of damages. But damages can not touch the
losses which neither party contemplated at the time the contract was entered
into. There was no means suggested by which either party could know
what the cost would be of building such an engine a year or so from the time of
entering into the agreement.
The court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has suffered damage in the
amount of $400, this being the difference between the contract price and the
cost of the material at the time of the making of the contract.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Had Johnson constructed the engine, he would have had a right to tender
it to Earl, and, Earl refusing to pay for it, to recover its price, $800. Ballentine
v. Robinson, 46 Pa. 177. Before procuring any material or doing any work,
Johnson was notified by Earl of his refusal to accept. Johnson, though he
might possibly have disregarded this notice and g0ne on with the building of
the engine, was not bound to do this. He might refrain, without rescinding
the contract. Under it he had a right by spending 8-500, to obtain from Earl
$800. Of this right, Earl could not deprive him. By refraining from spending
the $500 he did not forfeit his right to these $300. Cf. Gallagher v. Whitney,
147 Pa. 184; Keeler v. Schott, 1 Super, 458.
The learned court below has allowed a recovery of $400. It is distinctly
proven that the construction of theengine would have costJohnson $500. He
would have received for it $800. His profits would not have exceeded $300.
The breach of EarPs contract does not entitleJolnson to greater profits than
he would have made had Earl kept his promise.
Judgment reversed.

CRANMER vs. THE RAILROAD COMPANY.
Motionfor new trial-.Evidence-Physicalexaminationof personalinjuriesPower of court to appoint examiners.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Cranmer, ejected from the car of the company, alleges that he has suffered
several severe internal injuries. He calls three physicians, who examined him
and testify favorably to him. The defendant requests the court to appoint
two other physicians, and to require the plaintiff to suffer an examination by
them. This the court refused to do. It also offers to ask plaintiff if he had
not refused to submit to an examination by two physicians selected by it, who
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were well known practitioners. The court excluded the evidence. Verdict
for $4;000. Motion for a new trial.
Park for the motion.
When necessary, court may compel plaintiff to submit to a physical exanination. 11 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 540; Schoeder v. R. R. Co., 47 Ia.
376; White v. R. R. Co., 61 Wis. 536: Graves v. Battlecreek, 19 L. R. A. 641.;
Montgomery v. Turnpike Co., 37 Ohio 104.
Showalter, contra.
Courts have no power to compel a physical examination. 16 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. of Law, 811; R. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 2.50. Within discretion
of court, and not demandable of right. Hesn v. R. R. Co., 7 Pa. C. C. 565;
Shephard v. R. R Co., 85 Mo. 629; Owens v. R. R Co., 95 Nito. 169. No advantage gained by several examinations. Fowler v. Sergeant, 1 Grant 355.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
LAUB, J. :-The motion for a new trial brings before this court for review,

wlether at the trial of the case, it erred in refusing the request of the defendant that. the court should appoint two other physicians and require the
plaintiff toundergo an examination by them, and, also, whether it erred in refusing the offer of the defendant to ask the plaintiff if he had not refused to
submit to an examination by two physicians selected by it, who were well
known practitioners. In the United States the decisions are very conflicting
on the question whethera court hnas the power to compel the suitor in an action
for personal injuries to submit his person to an examination and inspection at
the instance of the opposite party when there is no statute expressly authorizing this practice. 16 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 811.
In the federal courts it is well settled that a court has no power at any
time or under any circumstances, to compel a plaintiff in an action for personal injuries to submit his person to a physical examination. Union Pacific
R. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250. The same rule has been followed in some
of the state courts, viz : Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, New York and Texas.
In Alabama, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Ohio, Washington and Wisconsin the opposite view is taken.
In our own state of Penusylvania, it has been held that the trial court
may order such an examination, but it is within the discretion of the court.
Demenstein v. Richardson, 2 Pa. Dist. Reports, 825; Hess v. Lake Shore R.
R. Co., 7 Pa. C. C. 567; Harvey v. Phila. Traction (o., 26 W. N. C. 231;
Lawrence v. Keim, 45 Leg. Int. 434.
In jurisdictions where the power to order a physical examination is upheld, the defendant cannot in any case, demand a physical examination as a
matter of right. The application is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. Hess v. Lake Shore R. R. Co., 7 Pa. C. C. 565. Neither will this
discretion be interfered with on appeal except where it has been manifestly
abused. Shepiard v. Mo. Pacific R. R. Co., 85 Mo. 629; Owens v. Kansas
CUlty, etc., R. R. Co., 95 Mo. 169.
The refusal of the court to order an examination of the plaintiff will not
be presumed to have been made on the ground of a want of power in the court
to make the order, but in the absence of any showing to the contrary, on the
ground that under the circumstances the order ought not to have been
granted. Miami, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Bailey, 37 Ohio, 104.
In the case before us, the plaintiff had three physicians examine him and
testify in his behalf on the trial. Their testimony was favorable to the plaintiff
and the defendants in their cross-examination of them 'did not shake their
tesUmony. Under these circumstances, we fail to see wherein we abused our
discretion in refusing the defendant's request, for no advantage is gained by
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suffering the plaintiff to undergo a large number of examinations by differelbt
physicians. Fowler v. Sergeant, 1 Grant, 355.
We do not think there was error in refusing the defendant's offer. In
Lane v. Spokane Falls & Northern Ry. Co., 46 L. R. A. 153, the court was
asked to instruct the jury, that .because the plaintiff had refused to consent
that her physicians should testify as to their examination of her personal injuries, the inference arose that their testimony, if given, would have been unfavorable to her, and it was held that such instructions should be refused.
If the defendant's offer had not been refused, the jury would most likely
have drawn the inference that the plaintiff was afraid to undergo an exaiaination at the hands of their physicians. Nor did the offer tend in any way to
show that the three physicians who had examined the plaintiff were incompetent or prejudiced in his favor.
Furthermore, a motion for a new trial is an appeal to the discretion of the
court, and, unless injustice be done, a new trial should not be granted. Commonwealth v. Aberle, 3 S. & R. 9; Commonwealth v. Duff, 7 Pa. Super. 415;
Slattery v. Knights of Maccabees; 19 Pa. Super. 108; again, unless the result
is manifestly wrong and unjust, the court is not bound to interfere. Cowperthwaite v. Jones, 2 Dall. 55; Cleland v. Borough of Carlisle, 186 Pa. 110; Palmer
v. Publishing Co., 7 Pa. Super. 594.
Even were we doubtful as to the refusal of the defendant's offer a new
trial would not secure the desired result, as the question would then again
arise for our determination.
For these reasons, then, the motion for a new trial must be overruled.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The plaintiff seeks compensation for internal injuries resulting from
ejection from the defendant's car. It is material to know whether he has
suffered these injuries, and how grave they are. That some light can, in the
opinion of the plaintiff, be cast on these questions by a medical examination
is evident from his having submitted himself to the examination of three
physicians of his own selection, of whose testimony he has also availed himself.
It is not easy to appreciate the objection to another examination by
physicians, who, not being selected by either party, but by the court, will be of
less questionable candor than the elect of the plaintiff. The facts ought to be
developed and the testimony of impartial experts, founded on an examination,
is more likely to develop them, than that of physicians selected, on what
principle we know not, by the party before the trial with a view td testifying
at the trial.
That the court may require such an examination has been denied by a
respectable authority, though hardly upon respectable grounds. Union Pacific
R. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250. Cf. criticism of this case by Wigmore, 3
Evidence 3019. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, has not treated the subject. The propriety of exercising the power, has, however, been conceded by
several judges of the lower courts. Demenstein v. Reickeson, 34W. N. C. 295,
2 Dist. 825, etc.
Perhaps the court should not unconditionally compel the plaintiff to submit to an examination, 2 Dist. 825. It is reasonable, however, to impose on
him the option of submitting to it, or of foregoing a recovery. We are of the
opinion that the trial court ought to have obliged the plaintiff, in the case before us, to undergo an examination by physicians selected by itself, or to suffer
anon-suit, or an indefinite continuance until compliance.
The defendant offered to prove that it had named two physicians to the
plaintiff with a request that he allow them to examine him and that he had
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,eclined to allow the examination. No objection to the competency or characterof these physicians was made. Yet the court refused to hear the proof.
This refusal might have been due to a fear that even a candid investigation
would injure his case. It might have been attributed also to his suspicion of
the integrity of the physicians selected. That different motives might have
actuated him is no justification of the exclusion of the evidence. Had it been
heard, the plaintiff might have explained his conduct. We think the court
should have heard the evidence. An illumining discussion of this subject
may be found in Wigmore's Evid-nce, vol. 3, pp. 2970, 3016.
Jndgment reversed with v.f. d. n.
ESTATE OF GEORGE ROOSEVELT
Adoption-By deed-Contract to adopt-Acts of Alay 4, 1855, and April 2,
1872, construed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On March 4, 1860, George Roosevelt, of Reading, Pennsylvania, received
from The German-American Guardian Society, of New York City, two of its
wards,-a boy and girl, brother and: sister,-named Wilhelm Schmidt, aged
about ten years, and Fredericka Schmidt, aged'about eight years, and on the
same day executed two deeds, the material provisions of which are recorded in
the opinions. The deed in Fredericka's case is exactly like that of her brother,
except ps to name and age. A month afterwards Mr. Roosevelt acknowledged
the two instruments before a justice of the peace, at Reading, and to thejustice's certificate of acknowledgment is appended the certificates of the prothonotary of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, to the authority,
&c., of the justice of the peace. Mr. Roosevelt then delivered the two documents to the society, and received or had delivered to him two exact duplicate" contracts executed on the part of the society. These deeds remain unrecorded.
Both of the children were reared by Mr. .Roosevelt, in his home at Reading, and both of them served their master faithfully until they were grown
up, Wilhelm leaving his home, with the consent of his master, just a short
time before reaching his legal majority, to live with one of Roosevelt's brothers, in Georgia, where he has resided ever since, but always maintaining a
friendly relationship With his master, through correspondence between them,
and otherwise.
Fredericka continued to reside with her master until her marriage, several
years after her brother settled in the South, and has since then resided at
3eadiig, and most of the time in a house furnished her by Mr. Roosevelt.
Mr. Roosevelt, until a short time before his death-he died January 15,
1903, a widower, leaving no issue and intestate-always regarded his act, under the said two deeds, an adoption of the said two children, but was led, a few
months before his death, to a formal statutory adoption of Fredericka, under
the Act of 9th May, 1889, sect. 1, P. L. 168, on the opinion of an attorney that
the deeds amounted to nothing more than an apprenticing contract.
Wilhelm Schmidt now claims one-half of the estate of George Roosevelt,
deceased, as an adopted child of his deceased foster father, under said (ado 1,
tion) deed of March 4, 1860.
Elder'forthe claimant.
No right to adopt at common law. Ballard v. Ward, 89 Pa. 358. Act of
11872 is directory, not mandatory, and a deed of adoption 'wed not be recorded
to be valid.

THE FORUM
TIqlcr for tie estate.
Acts )roviding for adoption being in derogation of the common law and
repugnant. to its principles are strictly construed. Ex parte Clark 87 Cal. 638.
In re Jesm'ut, 81 Cal. 408. Deed does not profess to give any present or future
right of inheritance. There is no contract to leave property to claimant.
Shurman v. Shurman, 17 S. & R. 45. The indenture must be construed to
limit the period of adoption to the time limited in the deed. McCully's Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 80.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

RENO, J. :--We are not disposed to question the constructions placed upon
the various Acts of the General Assembly, providing for the adoption of children. An extended examination of a number of authoritative textbooks
reveals the fact that at common law no right or method of adoption was
recognized. Nor does there seem to have been any generally accepted substitute for what in our present system of jurisprudence has been termed an
adoption. In some of the romance countries, methods of adoption did exist, but even these were brought into being only by force of an express enactment of the law making power. Credence is therefore to be given to the
opinion of Sharswood, J., who decided that at common law no right to adopt was
known, and that whatever power has been given, has come from enactments
of our legislature. Ballard v. Ward, 89 Pa. 358. Being in derogation of the
common law these acts have been strictly construed, and the contention of the
claimant in this case cannot be wholly justified either by the words of the
statutes or by the various interpretations put upon them.
The acts in question provide two modes of adoption, viz: (1) By judicial decree, Act 4th May 1855, P. L. 431 ; Brightly Purdon 61 (10th. edition),
and (2) by recording a deed of adoption, Act 2 April, 1872, P. L. 31 ; P. & L.
Digest 112. No one pretends that the first of these methods was utilized in
the adoption of the boy, Wilhelm Schmidt, nor is there any evidence that
the second, that of recording, was practiced.
It is undoubtedly true that these acts were passed to encourage adoption,
to provide means for its legalization, or, at least, to facilitate it, by providing
what should constitute proof of an adoption. Evidently, the legislature saw
something commendable in the consummation of the relation of foster parent
and adopted child. Nor is the Act of 1872 mandatory to the extent that it invalidates such common law deeds of adoption which are not recorded. It
might be argued from this as a premise that the legislature intended that a
deed of adoption unrecorded was valid, but recorded would afford greater
protection to both parties interested. It is, indeed, elementary law that a
deed, duly delivered, is valid as between the parties even though unrecorded,
and if the legislature had intended to override this ancient and well known
rule, it is reasonable to suppose that it would have expressly said so. However, notwithstanding these facts, we are not now prepared to depart from the
judicial construction accorded to these acts. Were there no other possible
ground on which the claimant's right might be sustained, we would be
tempted to give it effect as a common law deed of adoption by reason of the
recognition apparently accorded to such a form by the plain language of the
Act of 1872. Cf. McCully's Estate, 8 W.. N. C. 14 ; McCully's Estate, 10 W.
N.C. 80.
As far as we can ascertain, this case'is on all fours with Susman's Estate,
45 Pitt s. L. J. 101. We regret that by reason of non access to the Pittsburg
reports, we have been compelled to rely upon the accuracy of the editor of
Pepper & Lewis's Digest of Decisions, vide col. 25129.
In that case an unrecorded deed of adoption was given effect, by enforcing it as an agreement
to adopt after the death of the would-he foster parent. In fact, ev~t la verbal
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agreement to adopt was given effect in this same case. It was shown that tile
claimants had always been recognized as children and had rendered the
services due from children to parent. It was then said that the implied
covdnant arising from a contract to adopt, not legally executed, where the
child has fulfilled its part of the contract, is that the infant shall receive a
child's share of the estate of the foster parent.
Compare this with the present case. First of all, we have an instrument
under seal, in the common form of an indenture of apprenticeship. In addition to this we have a recital or a statement incorporated in the instrument
which sets forth the intentions bf the parties in a manner not to be misunderstood. The language is as follows: "Although the present instrument binds
the above named child as all apprentice, it is nevertheless the true intention
of the parties of the first part to place, and of the. party of the second part to
receive said apprentice as an adopted child, . . . to be treated, as far as
practicable, with like care and kindness its if he were in fact the child of the
party of the second part." Then, too, it is in evidence that the boy served
his master faithfully, and with the latter's consent, left his home to reside
with his master's brother. The pleasant relationship engendered by this
association during the period preceding the arrival of Wilhelm at his legal
majority, did not cease with his departure to the south, but was maintained
by correspondence and otherwise. We believe Roosevelt's intention as manifested In the deed must prevail and that the services rendered him by the
claimant impose, at least, a contractual liability on his estate, which can be
satisfied only by a payment to Wilhelm of the share he would have received
as an adopted child.
We do not attach much importance to the fact that Roosevelt, in 1903, was
led by recently acquired knowledge to adopt the girl, Fredericka, in accordance with the Act 9th May, 1889, P. L. 168; P. & Ti. Digest 112. Under our
view of the case the decedent's intention coupled with the claimant's services
must govern the decision. The fact that a few months before his death, the
decedent re-adopts one with all the formalities of law, and neglects thus to provide for the other, cannot be taken as a repudiation of his intentions, nor dispense with the necessity of paying for the services the child rendered under
the contract to adopt. A contract with one to adopt cannot be made less
binding by such an act on the part of the. decedent, especially where the cantract was executed by the rendition of services.
We need but add that there is nothing in the intestate laws opposed to
this theory.
It is, therefore, decreed that one-half of the estate of George Roosevelt be
set aside and paid to Wilhelm 8ohmidt in payment of the liability imposed by
this contract to adopt.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

An instrument, surmised to be an adoption of Wilhelm and Fredericka by
George Roosevelt, Is, upon his death, produced as support to the claim of Wilhelm to one-half of the personal estate, Fredericka claiming all of it under a
later statutory adoption.
That the power of adopting by deed did not exist at common law is positively asserted by Sbarswood, C. J., in Ballard v. Ward, 89 Pa. 358; Cf. MeCully's
Estate, 8W. N. C. 14; McCann's Estate, 9 Dist. 184. The Act of May 4, 1855,
first conferred the power of adoption, and then only by the instrumentality of
the court of Common Pleas. The Act of April 2, 1872, 1 P. & L. 112, recognizes
adoption by deed as "heretofore" practiced, but such a deed became valid by
the recognition thus given to it by this act, which provided that it might be
recorded, and that a duly certified copy thereof should be received jn evidence
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with the same force and effect as the record of adoption would have in tie
mode provided by the Act of May 4, 1855, P. L. 430. A deed of adoption made
before 1872 did not become valid until then, but even then could not divest
the estate of the adopting parent which had already vested in his heirs or next
of kin, by his death before the passage of the act of that year. Ballard v. Ward,
supra.
The deed before us was executed in 1860, but Mr. Roosevelt did not die until January 15, 1903. There was no such obstacle to its being rendered operative by the Act of 1872, as existed with reference to tile deed in Ballard v.
Ward, for Roosevelt's estate had not devolved. Cf. Gratz v. Motz, 17 W. N.
C. 190; McCann's Estate, 9 Dist. 184. If the deed adequately expresses an intention of Roosevelt to adopt, it effected an adoption, unless the failure to record
it prevents its having operation.
The deed is in the form of an indenture of apprenticeship. It witnesses
that the German-American Guardian Society "has put, placed and bound out
the said Wilhelm Schmidt, as all apprentice, until the said apprentice shall
attain the full age of 21 years."
Roosevelt binds himself, "during all the aforesaid term," to provide Wilhelm
with food, apparel, washing, etc., and to instruct him, and furnish bim "at
the expiration of the said term of service, anew Bible, and $100.' Thedeed then
states that "although the present instrument binds the above named child
strictly as an apprentice, it is nevertheless the true intention of the parties of
the first part to place, and of the party of the second part to receive, said apprentice as an adopted child to reside in the family of the party of the second
part, and to be maintained, clothed, educated and treated as far as practicable
with like care and kindness as if he were in fact the child of the party of the
second part."
It then provided that if the guardian society or the child, or Mr. Roosevelt, should within three months become dissatisfied, the child should be returned and the indentdre become void; but, after three months without such
return, the indenture should remain in force. It was made the duty of
Roosevelt to give information about the child from time to time. It was also
provided that this indenture should impose no responsibility in damages on
the society, but should "only operate as the full exercise of the powers conferred by its charter for the purposes herein expressed."
A perusal of this instrument does not convince us that anything else was
intended than to constitute Wilhelm an apprentice until he attained the age
of 21 years. ie is to be received during this period as an adopted child to reside in the family, and he is to be maintained, clothed, educated, etc., as "if
he were in fact the child" of Roosevelt. Of a similar instrument it was intimated, in McCully's Estate, 8 W. N. C. 14, that the period of adoption was
limited to the term of apprenticeship. This we regard the natural interpretation of the deed before us. Thechild was during his apprenticeship, to be taken
into tihe home of Roosevelt and there treated In all respects, as Roosevelt's
own child would be treated.
The deed makes no reference to Roosevelt's death, or to Wilhelm's participation thereupon, in his estate. It confines itself to treatment to be given
Wilhelm by Roosevelt, treatment therefore during the life of the latter. It
cannot "be intended" as Penrose, J., remarked of a similar deed, "beyoud the
lifetime of the.master and mistress, [there were two adopting parents in that
case] in whose estates it does not profess to give any present or future right of
inheritance whatever." McCully's Estate, 8 W. N. C. 14; affirmed in McCully's Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 80 ; Cf. McCann's Estate, 9 Dist. 184.
The Act of April 2nd, 1872, provides for the recording of the deed of adop-
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ticn and enacts that "a duly certified copy thereof shall be received in evidence with the same force and effect as the record of adoption would have"
under the Act of 1855. We are not able to adopt the opinion of'Penrose, J., in
McCann's Estate, 9 Dist. 184, that this direction must be so strictly followed that
no other proof of the deed than the certified copy is admissible. It would be
absurd to admit a copy and refuse to admit the original. It would be absurd to make the proof of execution before a non-judicial officer conclusive,
and not to admit proof of execution l5efore the judge or jury. The object of
the act, we opine, was not to negate the use of the original, but unrecorded,
deed, but to make the record, or a certified copy of the record, proof of it, as
in the case of deeds for the conveyance of land. The Roosevelt deed is duly
acknowledged, and it would be the duty of the recorder of deeds to record it.
How could an act which he must perform without discretion be indispensable
to the operativeness or the use of the deed?
The learned court below, not affirming distinctly the view that the
Roosevelt deed is gn adoption of Wilhelm, nevertheless treats it as a covenant
with Wilhelm that the latter shall have a child's share of his estate. We are
not able so to interpret it. The syllabus of Susman's Estate, 45 Pitts. L. J.
101, in 15 P. & L. Digest 25129, states that there was proof of a contract with A
to adopt the child, who afterwards was recognized as a child and rendered the
services usually rendered by a child. The agreement to adopt was verbal.
The court held apparently that while the child could not share in A's estate,
at his death, as an adopted child, yet it could share therein, as an adopted
child; that the covenant to adopt was an implied covenant that the child
should take asa child, and this covenant should be specifically enforced. This
is practically to decide that an adoption can be effected not merely by a deed,
but even by an oral covenant, provided that the parties, acting under the covenant for a half year, or year, or five years, treat each other as they would if a
deed had been made. Since, at common law A could not adopt B at all.'nd
since the power to adopt extra-curially Is the result of the Act of 1872, which
ratifies only "the common luw form of adopting a child by deed," we are not
able to adopt the view of Judge Over by which even an oral agreement followed by partial performance, should have the effect of a deed.
Besides, we have the deed of Roosevelt before us, and we have not been
able to discover in it an intention to adopt Wilhelm as a child for a longer
period than his minority. That affectionate relations did not end with his
majority can have no tendency to enlarge the signification of the deed.
What other relations could be expected between a 'man who for fifteen or
more years had been in close contact with the boy, and this boy who had
since gone to a distant state to live with a brother?
It is said that Mr. Roosevelt until a short time before his death, "always
regarded" his deed as an "adoption" of Wilhelm. It is apparent, however,
that he began to doubt. Otherwise, why did he procure a judicial adoption of
Fredericka? And, if he intended that Wilhelm should, at his death, be
treated as a son, as Fredericka should be treated as a daughter, why, when he
was applying to the court for the adoption of Fredericka, did he not ask for
the adoption of Wilhelm?.
Decree reversed with procedendo.

16o

THE FORUM

BOOK REVIEW
PENNSYLVAN IA LAW AND PROCEDURE IN DIvORcE.

By Harold H. Sturgeon. Philadelphia:T. & J. W. Johnson & Co., 1905.
In these days of agitation over the divorce evil, and the consequent discussion, both ecclesiastical and lay, concerning the general system of divorce
laws, a treatise expounding the principles on this subject pertaining to Pennsylvania, in a manner reasonably clear and satisfactory, is peculiarly fitting
and timely. A book upon the Pennsylvania law of divorce should be of interest accordingly at this time, and of use not only for the immediate and practical purposes of the busy attorney, but, in addition, -as affording to those engaged in study of the divorce problem a ready means of access to information
concerning the general policy and scope of our divorce law. The law ofdivorce,
compared with other branches, occupies such a small space in the vast body of
jurisprudence, one is somewhat appalled at the proportions of the present volume, expanded as it is to over four hundred pages. After a careful perusal of
these pages one is convinced the author has covered exhaustively the entire
law upon the subject in hand, both statutory and decisional. The plan of the
work, as is suggested by the title, is a treatment of, first, the substantive, and
then, the adjective law. A major portion of the book consists of analects from
opinions of the judges, in some instances the entire deliverances of the courts
have been inserted to illustrate the appropriate rules of law. A method so
wholesale is open to grave objection, among others the undue distention of
the volume in size, and a creation of some confusion of mind to the reader to
determine amid conflicting and clashing views what is sound principle. It is
conceived that reputable text writers have a- nobler mission than to merely
compile the various decisions. A result of this lack of effort to point out the
straight and narrow path may be observed in a comparison of the author's
quotations on pages 170 and 174, respectively, on the formerJudge King drawing a distinction between indignities to the person and personal indignities; on
the latter the court, in Brubaker v. Brubaker, defining "person ' as the indivisible personality formed by the union of the body and spirit, and holding
that indignities offered to either are necessarily offered to both. Without being carping or captious in criticism, one might venture to assert that, in view
of the fact the Act of 1891, P. L. 142, has been repealed by the Act of 1903, P.
L. 19, as noted by the author at p. 136 in the chapter on Conviction and Sentence, it was rather supererogatory to discuss at any length the construction
of the courts of the phrase, "forgery or any.infamous crime," as contained In
the former act. An inaccuracy is also pointed out at p. 44, possibly a typographical error, in referring to Walters' Appeal, 70 Pa. 393, as a decision of the
Common Pleas, whereas the report clearly shows the claim of the widow to
have been adjudicated in the Orphans' Court. Despite these strictures, the
work of the author is deeply appreeiated and recognized, and we venture the
prediction the volume will find a welcome in the hands of the busy practitioner, to whom its orderly plan and exhaustive treatment, as well as the set
of forms, will readily appeal as a handy book of reference. To the student of
Pennsylvania law the work will prove of great aid and assistance in acquiring
a fair knowledge of the decisions without culling them laboriously from the reports.

